It is impossible to make sense of persistent controversy over certain forms of decision-relevant science without understanding what happens in the much greater number of cases in which members of the public converge on the best available evidence without misadventure. In order to live well-or just to live, period-individuals must make use of much more scientific information than any (including a scientist) is in a position to comprehend or verify. They achieve this feat not by acquiring expertise in the myriad forms of science essential to their well-being but rather by becoming experts at recognizing what science knows-at identifying who knows what about what, at distinguishing the currency of genuine scientific understanding from the multiplicity of counterfeit alternatives. A rational form of information processing, their recognition of valid science is guided by recourse to cues that pervade their everyday interactions with other non-experts, whose own behavior convincingly vouches for the reliability of the scientific knowledge on which their own actions depend. Cases of persistent controversy over decision-relevance science don't stem from defects in public science comprehension; they are not a result of the failure of scientists to clearly communicate their own technical knowledge; nor are they convincingly attributable to orchestrated deception, as treacherous as such behavior genuinely is. Rather such disputes are a consequence of one or another form of disruption to the system of conventions that normally enable individuals to recognize valid science despite their inability to understand it. To preempt such disruptions and to repair them when they occur, science must form a complete understanding of the ordinary processes of science recognition, and democratic societies must organize themselves to use what science knows about how ordinary members of the public come to recognize what is known to science.
The perils of ignoring the denominator
We live in an age of spectacular public conflict over policy-relevant facts. Is the earth heating upand if so are humans the cause? Will vaccinating schoolgirls against the human papilloma virus promote their health by immunizing them from a cancer-causing sexually transmitted disease-or put their health at risk by lulling them into unprotected sex, thereby exposing them to other STDs and teen pregnancy? Do laws allowing private citizens to carry concealed handguns increase violent crime-or reduce it by enabling potential victims to defend themselves and by deterring violent predation more generally?
Each of these and numerous other factual questions are subject to intense, sustained political contestation. Yet each has also been the subject of extensive empirical investigation. Indeed, on each there is scientific consensus by the most reliable measures of such-authoritative pronouncements issued by expert panels charged with aggregating and weighing the extant evidence for the benefit of decision makers, individual and collective (e. The persistence of deep public division on such facts is rightly understood to pose a significant challenge to the prospects for enlightened selfgovernment. Individuals of diverse outlooks can't be expected always to agree on the ends of public policymaking. But if, in the face of voluminous quantities of sound, clearly articulated, and widely disseminated scientific evidence they cannot even agree on the facts, how can democratic citizens be expected to identify much less deliberate intelligently over the values-tradeoffs that competing policy responses entail? I will refer to the failure of valid scientific evidence to quiet disputes over policy-relevant facts as the Science Communication Problem. The stock of empirical studies examining how this state of affairs affects various issues is already ample, and is expanding at an accelerating pace. The central theme of this chapter is that scholarly fixation on such controversies itself is inhibiting both scientific investigation of the source of the Problem and discovery of effective means for counteracting it.
In a narrowly methodological sense, scholarly fixation on controversies that feature the Science Communication Problem involves a form of selecting on the dependent variable. Selecting on the dependent variable occurs when a study design tests a hypothesis with a sample that has been assembled on the basis of criteria that assume the truth of the hypothesis-or that in any case exclude from the sample observations that could well falsify it. This is a substantial problem in studies that purport to "explain" controversy over a single issue (human-caused climate change, for example) by examining public opinion on that issue alone. But the problem is barely any smaller for studies that purport to explain the Science Communication Problem generally by examining only sets of issues (climate change plus gun control plus nuclear power plus gun control plus the HPV vaccine etc.) that feature it.The simple fact is that the number of issues that actually display the Science Communication Problem is orders of magnitude smaller than the number that do not but plausibly could. Diverse members of the public in the U.S. are not divided over the hazards of chronic exposure to power-line magnetic fields; they aren't polarized over pasteurized milk; they aren't split on the carcinogenic effects of artificial sweeteners or food colorings-and so on and so forth (Kahan 2015b) (Figure 1) . A researcher who studies only public opinion on global warming or only global warming plus other issues Sources of Ordinary Science Knowledge-and Ignorance 3 that conspicuously feature the Science Communication Problem will never be able to be confident that any influence she identifies as affecting those issues truly is affecting them if she has failed to confirm that those influences are absent in the myriad cases in which diverse members of the public have converged on the best available evidence (or at least converged on something).
But this mistake-one, essentially, of "ignoring the denominator" when looking at issues that feature the science of Science Communication Problem-shouldn't be understood in narrow, methodological terms only. It is in fact symptomatic of something much bigger, much more fundamental: a cultural science of science communication literacy deficit. The sorts of explanations for the Science Communication Problem that appear plausible when researchers and others confine their attention solely to controversies that feature conspicuous instances of the Science Communication Problem are ones that, to be blunt, reflect widespread and long-standing misunderstandings of the ordinary processes by which the public comes to know what is known by science. Forms of science communication that reflect these misunderstandings are at best ineffectual and at worst highly counter-productive.
Or so I will argue. The remainder of this essay will be divided between efforts to illustrate the sorts of mistakes we are likely to make if we "ignore the denominator" when investigating the Science Communication Problem, the focus of Part 2; and, in Part 3, efforts to furnish a glimpse of the insights into the Problem that can be achieved when researchers examine the sources of ordinary science knowledge-that is, the influences that enable the public to agree about so much of what science knows. Part 4 identifies what juxtaposing ordinary science knowledge and the Science Communication Problem implies about the proper focus for the emerging field of "science of science communication."
Four false starts
What makes persistent public disagreement over policy-relevant facts so puzzling is not the scarcity of explanations for this phenomenon; on the contrary, it is the surfeit of them. The number of plausible mechanisms that might account for the Science Communication Problem far exceeds the number that could be true. Separating the true (or more likely to be true) from the merely plausible is the principle mission of empirical research (Watts 2011) .
Four plausible explanations for the Science Communication Problem quickly become much less so when we don't make the error of "ignoring the denominator" -or systematically averting our empirical gaze from the almost infinitely large class of cases in which we don't see public conflict over decision-relevant science but easily could. I'll call these mistakes the four "False Starts," and give each one its own label:
I. "The public is irrational"; II. "First thing we do-let's kill all the scientists"; III. "Welcome to the age of science denial"; and IV. "The public is being manipulated." 2.1 . The most plausible-and also most commonly asserted-explanation for the Science Communication Problem is the public's limited capacity to comprehend science. The public is only modestly science literate. About half, we are regularly reminded, understands that the earth orbits the sun in a year as opposed to a day (National Science Foundation 2016); less than a quarter knows that nitrogen is the most common gas in the earth's atmosphere (Pew 2013); less than ten percent can make sense of a two-by-two contingency table essential to determining the ratio of true-to false-positives when assessing medical test results (Kahan 2016) . So how can members of the public possibly be expected to understand what scientists are saying when scientists try to explain complex issue like climate change or nuclear power?
More importantly still, members of the public don't think the way scientists do. They rely on rapid, intuitive, affect-driven sources of information processing to the exclusion of the deliberate, conscious, analytic ones essential to making appropriate judgments of risk. As a result, they tend to overestimate the magnitude of more emotionally charged calamities (terrorists attacks, e.g.) and discount actuarially more consequential but more temporally or emotionally remote ones (e.g., the impact of humancaused climate change). They also are more likely to rely on defective heuristics, such as crediting the opinions of their peers, a form of reasoning that can trigger self-reinforcing states of polarization (e.g., Marx, Weber et al. 2007; Sunstein 2005 Sunstein , 2007 .
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The "public irrationality thesis" or PIT, let's call it, is plausible. But if we don't ignore the denominator, we'll quickly see that it is indeed a false start.
What attending to the denominator allows us to see is how many more instances of the Science Communication Problem we'd expect to see if PIT were the explanation for it. Why aren't members of the public either politically fragmented over, or uniformly anxious about, medical x-rays, for example? The answer cannot be that members of the public are experts on nuclear science; half of them think (or incorrectly guess) that "atoms" are "smaller than electrons" (National Science Foundation 2016). It is also clear that "radiation" generally makes them queasy-an affective response that accounts for widespread fear of nuclear power (e.g., Peters, Burraston & Mertz 2004) .
Or how about nanotechnology? Although still routinely applied, the label "emerging technology" clearly no longer fits: the last decade has seen the steady introduction of nanotechnology consumer goods, which now total some 2000 (Vance, Kuiken et al. 2015) . One might have imagined (or fretted) that the "grey goo" doomsday scenario popularized by K. Eric Drexler's 1986 book Engines of Creation would furnish affectively rich soil for growing public risk perceptions. But environmental activists have been trying to cultivate such fears for over a decade (e.g., "Green Goo: Nanotechnology Comes Alive" 2003) with zero success. The reason isn't that the public has been inoculated with valid scientific information on nanotechnology, over 75% of Americans-a proportion that has not moved in over a decade-says that it knows little or nothing about it (Liang, Ho et al. 2015) .
2.2. A related false start blames scientists. If despite the clarity of the evidence, members of the public aren't converging on some policy-relevant facts, the reason must be that scientists are failing to convey the evidence clearly enough (e.g., Brownell, Price & Steinman 2013) . Or maybe they are speaking out too clearly, crossing the line from factfinder to policy advocate in a manner that compromises their credibility (e.g., Tamsin 2013) . Or perhaps what is compromising their credibility is how cagily they are hiding their advocacy by implausibly asserting that the facts uniquely determine particular policy outcomes (e.g., Fischoff 2007).
While one can make a compelling normative case for scientists speaking with greater clarity (Olson 2009; Dean 2009) or with less certitude about policy outcomes (Lempert, Groves & Fischbach 2013) , the idea that how scientists talk is the cause of the Science Communication Problem is palpably unconvincing (see Atkin and Scheuffele, Chapter X). Again, all one has to do is look at the myriad science issues that don't provoke persistent controversy. How about raw milk (Sci., Media, & Public Res. Group 2016)? Is there some reason to believe biologists have been doing a better job explaining pasteurization than climate scientists have been doing explaining the greenhouse effect? What folksy idioms or tropes did the former use that were so effective in quieting political polarization? Or was it that they just were more genuinely neutral on whether people should drink their milk straight up from the cow's udder?
Here, obviously, I'm relying on a cascade of rhetorical questions in lieu of evidence. But the absence of evidence is my evidence. No one has ever thought it worthwhile to construct a statistical model to test whether the difference between public acceptance of, say, the dangers of ozone depletion, on the one hand, and those of human-caused climate change, on the other, correlates with the clarity and policy-neutrality of the National Academy of Sciences' respective reports on those issues (National Research Council 1976 , 1982 , 2008 , 2011 ; or whether the difference between how readily, and how rapidly, states added the adolescent HBV vaccination to their mandatory school-enrollment immunization schedules, on the one hand, and how persistently they have resisted adoption of the HPV vaccine, on the other (Kahan 2013) , correlates with the clarity and policy-neutrality of the American Academy of Pediatrics' endorsements of both (American Academy of Pediatrics 1992 Pediatrics , 2007 .
Likely no one has because it's clear to the naked ear that what these groups of scientists had to say on the uncontested members of these societal-risk pairs (ozone depletion, the HBV vaccine) was no less obscure and no less opinionated than what they had to say about the contested ones (climate change, the HPV vaccine). But whatever the source of the omission, including only contested cases in the sample and leaving uncontested ones out necessarily defeats any valid inference about how the "obscurity" or "partisanship" of scientists' own words affects the Science Communication Problem. 
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Another false-start account of the Science
Communication Problem attributes it to growing resistance to the authority of science itself. Along with widespread disbelief in evolution, political conflict over global warming or other issues is variously depicted as evidence of either the "anti-science" sensibilities of a particular segment of the public (e.g., Mooney 2012) or of a creeping anti-science strain in American culture generally (e.g., Frank 2013).
Anyone who manages to divert his gaze from the Science Communication Problem is sure to spy evidence massively out of keeping with this account. In its biennial Science Indicators series, for example, the National Science Foundation (2016) includes survey measures that consistently evince effusive degrees of confidence in and support for science ( Figure 2 ). These levels of support do not vary meaningfully across groups defined by their political outlooks or degrees of religiosity ( Figure 3) . Indeed, the levels of support are so high that it would be impossible for them to harbor practically significant levels of variance across groups of any substantial size. For behavioral validation of these sensibilities, all one has to do is look at the care-free confidence individuals evince in science when making decisions both mundane (the ingestion of a pill to preempt hair loss) and vital (submission to radiation therapy for cancer). Because this evidence is so obvious, it's less likely proponents of the "age of denial" thesis don't see it than that they see it as irrelevant. On this view, confusion over or rejection of the dispositive evidence that science has collected on humancaused climate change or human evolution just is evidence of a deficit in the cultural authority of science.
But in that case, what started out as an explanation for the Science Communication Problem has transmuted, ironically, into a piece of evidenceimpervious dogma. Is it possible that some influence wholly unrelated to the authority of science accounts for the peculiarly contested status of this collection of issues? The question is now ruled out by definitional fiat.
2.4. Advocates seeking to mislead the public on issues that feature the Science Communication Problem are legion. But this does not in itself establish that orchestrated misinformation campaigns cause the problem. Indeed, studies that purport to find causation by focusing on misinformation on climate change or other contested issues furnish textbook examples of selecting on the dependent variable. The excluded observations, again, are other science issues that do not fit the profile associated with the Science Communication Problem. The inference that misinformation causes the Problem's signature form of persistent contestation is warranted only if (among other things) examination of relevant cases that lack such contestation reveals the absence of comparable sources of misinformation. If, in contrast, we discover that issues unplagued by the Science Communication Problem are not free of the scourge of misinformation, then we will have reason to doubt that misinformation furnishes a satisfactory explanation of why some issues are characterized by this problem. 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012. N's = 4653 (left_right) , 4607 (religiosity). "Left_right" is political outlook scale formed by aggregation of 7-point liberalconservative ideology and 7-point partisan identification items (α = 0.65). "Religiosity" is standardized score on scale formed by aggregation of self-reported religiosity, frequency of prayer, and church attendance (α = 0.79).
In fact, parties seeking to mislead the public on issues unaffected by the Science Communication Problem are legion, too. Likely the most compelling example involves GM foods, which have been repeatedly found to be as safe as their conventionally grown equivalents (National Research Council 2016) . Never mind the $25 million that GM labeling proponents spent merely to strike out on public referenda in three politically liberal states-Oregon, Washington, and California, the last of which defeated a labeling initiative in a year in which President Obama crushed his Republican rival Mitt Romney by twenty percentage points (Tims 2014; Chokshi, 2013; Flynn 2012) . Forget, too, that the U.S. Congress has now passed into law a federal statute that these groups bitterly fought and that will preempt any further attempts by them to mandate on-package labelling (Bjerga & Keane 2016) . Those results have marked only the final step in the long march of futility for GM foes in trying to arouse public concern. After twenty years of persistent agitating, anti-GM groups have not only failed to generate the level of public anxiety that has historically surrounded issues such as nuclear power, toxic waste disposal, and air and water pollution in the U.S.; they have failed to even produce discernable comprehension that GM foods exist at all. Less than 50% of the public realizes that GM foods are already on supermarket shelves (in 75% of every food product on sale there, in fact), and only 25% (incredibly!) that they have ever consumed any (Hallman, Cuite & Morin 2013). When specifically asked, bewildered survey respondents say they prefer the issue of whether and how to regulate GM foods simply be left to expert regulators to deal with as those experts see fit (McFadden & Lusk 2016) .
Of course, as ample as their efforts to sow confusion have been (e.g. Kloor 2012), supporters of GM food regulation have no doubt spent less to mislead citizens than have, say, opponents of climate change regulation. But the more apt comparison is with the efforts of GM food opponents in Europe, where comparable investments have paid handsome dividends: high levels of anxiety about GM technology in popular opinion, and the regulatory exclusion of GM products from consumer markets (Sato 2007) . Manipulating public opinion is not as easy as it looks-or at least not as easy as one might infer if one makes the mistake of examining only cases that feature the Science Communication Problem and ignore all the rest. Nothing in this account by any means suggests that efforts to mislead the public are never of consequence in cases that feature the Science Communication Problem. But obviously there are other influences that determine when misinformation matters and how much. Unless one's sample includes a fair representation of issues that don't feature the Science Communication Problem, no amount of data collection will help to identify what those influences are. The exposition will be admittedly skeletal. It, too, consists in nothing more than four propositions. These relate to ordinary science knowledge-or the normal state of collective convergence by members of the public on what is known by science:
I. "Individuals must accept as known more decision relevant science (DRS) than they can possibly understand or verify for themselves"; II. "Individuals acquire the insights of DRS by reliably recognizing it"; III. "Public conflict over DRS is a recognition problem, not a comprehension problem"; and IV. "The recognition problem reflects a polluted science communication environment."
Even when the argument is presented in this form, however, I expect it to bear sufficient weight to show that adding empirical muscle to it-by making ordinary science knowledge the focus of scientific conjecture and refutation (Popper 1962a )-is the best way to advance the project to understand and to solve the Science Communication Problem.
3.1. The motto of the Royal Society is Nullius in verba, which translates literally into "take no one's word for it." But something-namely, any pretense of being a helpful guide to getting the benefits of scientific knowledge-is definitely lost in a translation that literal.
If you aren't vigorously nodding your head, then consider this possibility. You learn next week that you have an endocrinological deficit that can be effectively treated but only if you submit to a regimen of daily medications. You certainly will do enough research to satisfy yourself-to satisfy any reasonable person in your situation-that this recommendation is sound before you undertake such treatment.
But what will you do? Will you carefully read and evaluate all the studies that inform your physician's recommendation? If those studies refer, as they inevitably will, to previous ones the methods of which aren't reproduced in those papers, will you read those, too? If the studies you read refer to concepts with which you aren't familiar, or use methods which you have no current facility, will you enroll in a professional training program to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills? And once you've done that, will you redo the experiments-all of them; not just the ones reported in the papers that support the prescribed treatment but also those relied on and extended by them-so you can avoid taking anyone's word on what the results of such studies actually were as well?
Of course not. Because by the time you did those things, you'd be dead. To live well-or just to live-individuals (including scientists) must accept much more DRS than they can ever hope to make sense of on their own.
Science's way of knowing involves crediting as true only inferences rationally drawn from observation. This was-still is-a radical alternative to other ways of knowing that feature truths revealed by some mystic source to a privileged few, who alone enjoy the authority to certify the veracity of such insights. That system is what the founders of the Royal Society had in mind when they boldly formulated their injunction to "take no one's word for it." But it remains the case that to get the benefits of the distinctive, and distinctively penetrating, mode of ascertaining knowledge they devised, we must take the word of those who know what's been ascertained by those means-while being sure not to take the word of anyone else (Shapin 1994) . 
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have to become experts in the relevant domain of knowledge themselves. Again, it is obvious that they lack both the capacity and time to do that.
Instead they have to become experts at recognizing valid sources of science. They become expert at that, moreover, in the same way they become expert at recognizing anything else: by using a conglomeration of cues, which operate not as necessary and sufficient conditions, but as elements of prototypical representations (e.g., "cat," "advantageous chess position," "ice cream sandwich," "expert") that are summoned to mind by mental processes, largely unconscious, that rapidly assimilate the case at hand to a large inventory of prototypes acquired through experience. In a word (or two words), they use pattern recognition (Margolis 1993) . This is equivalent to the answer that Popper gave (in an essay the title, and much more, of which are the inspiration for this one) in answering the near-identical question about how we come to know what is known by science. Popper's target was a cultural trope of sensory empiricism that treated as "scientific knowledge" only what one has observed for oneself. After impaling this view on the speartips of a series of reductios, Popper explains that most things we know"-i.e., know to be known to science-"we have learnt by example, by being told." In appraising the conformity of any such piece of information to the qualities that invest it with the status of scientific knowledge, moreover, an individual must rely on "his knowledge of persons, places, things, linguistic usages, social conventions, and so on" (ibid., p. 30). To be sure, powers of critical reasoning play a role. We must calibrate this facility of recognition by "learning how to criticize, how to take and to accept criticism, how to respect truth" (ibid, p. 36), a view Baron (1993) and Keil (2003 Keil ( , 2010 Keil ( , 2012 both develop systematically.
But the objects of the resulting power to discern valid science are not the qualities that make it valid: those are simply far too "complex," far too "difficult for the average person to understand (Baron, 1993, p, 193) . What this faculty attends to instead are the signifiers of validity implicit in informal, everyday social processes that vouch for the good sense of relying on the relevant information in making important decisions (Keil 2010 (Keil , 2012 . Popper characterizes the aggregation of these processes as "tradition," which he describes as "by far the most important source of our knowledge" (1962b, p. 36).
It is worth noting that although Popper here is referring to the process by which ordinary science knowledge is disseminated to nonscientists, there is no reason to think that scientists are any less in need of their own valid-science recognition capacity, or that they acquire or exercise it in a fundamentally different way. Indeed, there is ample reason to think that it couldn't possibly differ from the faculty that members of the public use to recognize valid science (Shapin 1994) aside from its being more finely calibrated to the particular insights and methods needed to be competent in the production of the same (Margolis 1987 (Margolis , 1996 . "How do we gain our knowledge about how to analyze data?" ask Andrew Gelman and Keith O'Rourke (2015, pp., 161-2) . By "informal heuristic reasoning," they reply, of the sort that enables those immersed in a set of practice to see the correctness of an answer to a problem before, and often without ever being able to give a fully cogent account of, why.
3.3. Now we can start to put things together.
The First False Start, PIT, attributes the Science Communication Problem to defects in the public's capacity to understand science. Challenging this position, I noted the absence of contestation over myriad other risk sources about which members of the public know just as little and on which they are no better equipped to analyze data. The Second Thesis posits that where the Science Communication Problem is absent, members of the public converge on the best evidence not by comprehending its validity but rather but by recognizing it.
If these claims are correct, then we should expect the Science Communication Problem to be one that affects the capacity of the pubic to recognize valid science, not their capacity to comprehend it.
That is a proposition easily tested. 
Global warming Private gun possession Fracking
None at all Genetically modified food
Extremely high risk
Artificial food colorings
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The tests that can be performed are two, First, one can examine whether lower degrees of science comprehension predict disagreement on issues affected by the Science Communication Problem.
The answer is no. There is zero correlation, in fact, between belief in human-caused climate change and how individuals perform on a valid "climate science literacy" test (Kahan 2015a) (Figure  4) . Indeed, political polarization doesn't abate as individuals become more proficient in numeracy, cognitive reflection, and other capacities essential to accurate risk perception increase; on the contrary, it increases ( Thus, members of the groups that disagree about key facts on human-caused climate change, nuclear power, and gun control, for example, disagree just as sharply about what scientific consensus is on those facts. In addition, if we treat, say, the National Academy of Sciences' expert consensus reports as a benchmark, no group is any more likely than any other to be correct about what scientific consensus is across the run of issues on which contending cultural groups are divided (Kahan, JenkinsSmith & Braman 2011 ). This result is contrary, of course, to the Third False Start, which asserts that we've entered an "age of science denial" since it shows that no group understands itself to be "rejecting" the weight of scientific opinion on any of the issues featured in the Science Communication Problem. That these groups are forming such unreliable judgments on what scientists' consensus is, however, suggests that something is disabling their members from correctly assessing information about what genuine experts believe on these matters.
That inference has been confirmed experimentally. When evaluating a highly credentialed scientist, individuals of opposing cultural identities will conform their assessment of the expertise of that scientist within the relevant domain to whether he was depicted as supporting or opposing the position that predominates within the subjects' own groups. In other words, rather than treating the view of a particular expert scientist as reason to adjust their assessment of the weight of scientific opinion on the issue at hand (whether human beings are causing global warming; whether laws allow carrying of concealed weapons in public increases or decreases crime; whether nuclear wastes can be safely deposited in deep geologic isolation), study subjects use their current position to determine what weight to give the view of any particular scientist (ibid) (Figure 6 ). Note, too, that this style of reasoning dispenses with the need for anyone to engage in misinformation-the fourth False Start-in order to exploit the Science Communication Problem. No one is doing anything to misinform the subjects in this study; the subjects are aggressively misinforming themselves by selectively crediting or discrediting evidence on what scientists believe in patterns that cohere with the positions associated with their group identities.
That is a style of reasoning in the nature of confirmation bias. When indulged in outside the lab, it will result in the pattern of persistent disagreement about scientific consensus that we observe in the world. It is a pattern of information processing, moreover, that systematically blocks diverse members of the public from giving effect to cues that would otherwise be expected to help them converge in their recognition of who knows what about what.
3.4. The species of pattern recognition that non-expert members of the public normally use to recognize valid science enables them to get the benefit of substantially more scientific insight than any could possibly hope to comprehend. The evidence I described in the last section, however, shows how this critical capacity can be disabled. The final "thesis of ordinary science knowledge" identifies the source of this disablement: a polluted science communication environment.
As noted, Popper (1962b) attributes the acquisition and exercise of the capacity for sciencerecognition to immersion in a set of social processes and conventions. When I refer to the science communication environment, I mean the sum total of the processes and conventions that enable recognition of valid science in this way (Kahan 2015b) . Any influence that impairs or impedes the operation of these social practices will degrade the power of free, reasoning citizens to recognize valid science, and hence to fully realize its benefits. As a result, we may understand any such influence to be a form of pollution in the science communication environment.
The sorts of influences that can generate such disablement are no doubt numerous and diverse. But I will focus on one, which degrades an especially consequential cue of science validity.
Of all the sources of ordinary science knowledge, by far the most significant are individuals' interactions with others with whom they a share cultural commitments or basic understanding of the best way to live. The suggestion that direct communication with scientists is more consequential reflects either the First or Second False Start or both: individuals have neither the time nor the capacity to extract information directly from scientists. Much more accessible, and much more readily subject to meaningful interpretation, are words and actions of other ordinary people, whose use of DRS vouches for their confidence in it as a basis for decision.
Indeed, it vouches as effectively when nothing is said about it as it does when something is. Nothing-including a new National Academy of Sciences expert consensus report (National Research Council 2016) that few members of the public will ever recognize exists-will as effectively assure an ordinary person that it is safe to eat GM corn chips as will watching his best friend and his brother-in-law and his officemate eating them without giving the matter a second's thought; seeing what these models of normal behavior do is the "all clear" signal that obviates the need for the vast majority of Americans even to bother learning that the corn chips they are eating contain GM foods (Hallman, Cuite & Morin 2013) . Social proof (Aronson 1999 ) is the dominant mode of communicating the reliability of decisionrelevant science for non-expert members the public.
Of course, ordinary citizens don't interact only with those with whom they share important cultural commitments. But they interact with them much more than they interact with others, for the simple reason that they find their company more congenial and more conducive to all manner of profitable intercourse. They are also less likely to waste time squabbling with these people, and can also read them more reliably, distinguishing those who really do know what science knows from those who are only posers. It is perfectly rational, then, for them to consciously seek guidance from those who share their outlooks, and to form unconscious habits of mind that privilege these individuals as sources of guidance on what science knows (Kahan 2015b ).
This process is admittedly insular, but it clearly works in the main. All of the major cultural groups in which this process operate are amply stocked both with members high in science comprehension and with intact social processes for transmitting what they know. No group that lacked these qualitiesand that as a result regularly misled its members on the content of valid DRS-would last very long! On issues that don't display the profile of the Science Communication Problem, those highest in science proficiency do tend to converge on the best available evidence, and no doubt pull the other members of their groups along in their wake ( Figure 5 ).
But such a system is vulnerable to a distinctive pathology: identity-protective cognition (IPC). IPC occurs when a policy-relevant fact that admits of empirical inquiry becomes entangled in antagonistic social meanings that transform positions on them into badges of identity in, and loyalty to, competing cultural groups (Kahan 2010 (Kahan , 2012 . The cost under those conditions of forming factually incorrect beliefs on matters such as whether humans are heating up the earth or whether fracking will exhaust or contaminate drinking water sources is essentially zero: individuals' personal views and actions are not consequential enough to affect the level of risk they face, or the likely adoption of ameliorating (or simply pointless or even perverse) regulatory responses. But given what beliefs on these subjects (correct or incorrect) have come to signify about the kind of person one is-about whose side one is on, in what has become a struggle for status among competing cultural groups-the personal cost of forming the wrong ones in relation to one's own cultural identity could be punishingly high (Kahan, Peters et al. 2012 ).
In such circumstances, individuals can be expected to use their reason to form and persist in beliefs that reliably vouch for their group identities regardless of whether those beliefs are factually accurate. This conclusion is consistent with numerous studies, observational (Bolsen, Druckman & Cook 2015 Gollust, LaRussao et al. 2015; Gollust, Dempsey, et al. 2010 ) and experimental (Kahan, Braman, et al. 2009 , that link IPC to the Science Communication Problem's signature forms of polarization. Indeed, individuals who enjoy the highest level of proficiency will display this form of motivated reasoning to the greatest extent, precisely because they will be the most adept at using their reasoning proficiency to secure the interest that they share to form identity-expressive beliefs (Kahan in press).
In sum, the antagonistic social meanings that trigger IPC are a toxic form of pollution in the science communication environment of culturally pluralistic societies. They disable individuals' sciencerecognition capacities, not by diminishing their reason but by conscripting it into the service of advancing their group's cause in a demeaning form of cultural status competition. IPC does not create the role that social influences play in popular recognition of what science knows. Rather it corrupts them, transforming the role that spontaneous, everyday social interactions play from an engine of convergence on the best available evidence into a relentlessly aggressive agent of public dissensus over what scientific consensus really is.
Understanding and protecting the science communication environment
I will conclude by adding to the "four theses of ordinary science knowledge" a fifth:
V. Protecting the science communication environment from contamination is the principal aim of the science of science communication.
The Fifth Thesis places an analytical capstone atop the arc of the argument this essay has presented. I began by showing that "ignoring the denominator"-fixating on the relatively small number of cases that feature persistent public conflict over policy-relevant facts and ignoring the vastly larger number of ones that feature convergencepredictably generates insupportable explanations of the Science Communication Problem. Next I examined how attending to the dynamics that account for the normality of public convergence on what is known by science generates a much better explanation: the disruption of the everyday social processes productive of the cues that certify the validity of decision relevant science. A research program aimed at managing those influences-at neutralizing the disruptive influence that they exert on the sources of ordinary science knowledge-is ideally calculated to test this theory and thus advance knowledge of how people come to know what is known by science.
But more fundamentally, the Fifth Thesis is intended to summon the energy and focus needed for the science of science communication to perfect enlightened self-government. As Popper (1945) also famously made clear, liberal democracy is the political regime must congenial to the advancement of scientific knowledge. The privileged status it affords individual freedom of thought fuels the engine of scientific conjecture and refutation and removes any Sources of Ordinary Science Knowledge-and Ignorance 13 bureaucratic impediment to its relentless convergence on truth.
But precisely because the highly diverse citizens of this regime will not submit to a central authority's certification of the truth (Nullius in verba!), they face a distinctive epistemic challenge. The problem is not the absence of a social system of truth certification; they have one-"tradition"-without which scientific "knowledge would be impossible" (Popper 1962b, p. 36) . But in a pluralistic liberal regime, there will necessarily be a plurality of certifiers-a plurality of communities, bonded by their shared view of the good, whose interactions generate the multiple "traditions," immersion in which calibrates the reasoning faculties their members use to recognize valid science. Conflicts among these plural communities of certification, even if rare, are statistically certain to arise as their members' independence of mind and freedom of action continuously enlarge the stock of scientific knowledge at their disposal. The threat IPC poses to the science communication environment is intrinsic to the very conditions that make liberal democratic societies so distinctively fit for producing scientific knowledge.
But this is not an "inherent contradiction" in the constitution of the Liberal Republic of Science. It is just a problem to be solved-with the instrument best suited for solving any problem that threatens the welfare of its citizens: the power that science's distinctive method of disciplined observation and inference confers on human reason. Assuring that the citizens of liberal democratic regimes get the full benefit of the knowledge that their way of life makes possible is what the Science of Science Communication is for (Kahan 2015b) .
